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Abstract 
We respond to the call for a more balanced view of agency (Tourish, 2014: 88) by presenting an 
account of the forced resignation of Jean-Marie Messier as CEO of the major French company, 
Vivendi Universal, in 2002. Messier’s ousting arose from a struggle for board control involving 
an exercise of power that was influenced strongly by kinship relationships, interlocking 
directorships, and business alliances; and by the interplay between a nouveau riche (Messier), 
an influential old guard shareholder family (the Bronfmans), and an established elite (of 
prominent representatives of French business. Collusion between the French business 
establishment and the Bronfman family created a coalition of interest and a locus of control 
that managerial and agency theories explain inadequately. We highlight the potential for a 
reading of class relationships in terms of structuration to foster better understanding of 
the complexities involved when the board of a major corporation decides to support, or 
withdraw support for, their CEO. We highlight several context-specific structures and 
mechanisms that were influential in determining corporate control and CEO agency. 
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Introduction 
We are motivated by Tourish (2014) to develop a more expansive view of agency. We do so in a 
context in which agency is defined as ‘the capacity [of leaders] to take action’ (Tourish, 2014: 
80). We confess to having tended, in the past, to attribute excessive agency to the Chief 
Executive Officer [CEO] of major corporations. Tourish’s (2014) analysis has prompted us to re-
think. We also answer the call of Collinson (2014) to mitigate the deep-seated tendency in 
leadership studies to rely on dichotomous thinking, where ‘leaders’ personas and practices 
have tended to be privileged and psychological perspectives and positivist methodologies 
predominate’ (p. 39).  
We highlight the merit of re-thinking our understanding of leadership dynamics, and how a 
CEO’s agency can be mitigated by structural factors to form new locations of power. Our study 
offers implicit critique of the stream of research in leadership that attributes excessive agency 
to the CEO. This is particularly evident in the dominant leadership theory of the past three 
decades, that of transformational leadership (see van Knippenberg and Sitkin, 2013, for 
extended analysis and critique). As such, this paper could be associated with the critical 
leadership studies paradigm. The approach to agency we advocate does not have a 
dichotomizing impulse. Rather, we use dialectics between agency and structures to emphasise 
the role of other organizational actors (such as members of the board of directors and their 
networked associates). While exercising their agency, these other organizational actors create 
social structures which have the capacity to reduce CEO agency.  
In this paper we provide an encompassing view of agency – one that does not conceive 
agency as absolute, formal, hierarchical and capable of quantitative determination. Rather, we 
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view agency as being influenced by what Giddens (1976) calls ‘the duality of structure.’ We 
locate our study, generally, in the non-economics (rather than economics) paradigm of agency 
theory (Shapiro, 2005). We concentrate more on agency theory’s political science paradigm 
(addressing matters of delegation of power and authority) and the sociology paradigm 
(analyzing how relationships affect control in complex systems). In terms of the ‘streams’ of 
agency theory literature identified by Shapiro (2005: 269-70), our focus is applied more to 
examinations of ‘corporate governance and control’ than to matters of ‘incentive alignment 
…[and] compensation policies’ or to ‘agency problems, agency costs and agency efficacy.’ 
We use the lens of a case study of the quest for board control of a large French company, 
Vivendi Universal [VU]. Our focus is on the circumstances that led VU’s board of directors to 
replace Jean-Marie Messier as CEO and Chair in 2002. We aim to provide a ‘more balanced view 
of agency which takes a fuller account of the agency of other actors’ (Tourish, 2014: 88) by 
having regard for their empowerment through particular social structures.  
We reveal how the interplay of kinship bonds, interlocking directorships, business alliances 
and related structures and mechanisms influenced relationships between VU’s CEO and its 
board of directors; and how this interplay affected the company’s control dynamics. We use an 
analytical framework based principally on Zeitlin (1974) and Palmer and Barber (2001), but 
informed also by Giddens’ (1976) structuration theory. We implicate a coalition of influence 
(comprising an old guard family and an established elite in French business) in the dismissal of 
Messier as CEO, and in limiting his agency. In the eyes of many, Messier was an unpatriotic 
nouveau riche (that is, a person from a low social class who had recently become very rich). 
According to Dickerson (2003: 1045), ‘Messier’s sin was in part his extraordinary arrogance … 
 
 
 4 
[and his systematic] “Americanization” [of] both his French company and, in the process, his 
role as CEO.’ 
We draw attention to the limited capacity of agency theory to explain corporate 
governance behavior and to reflect the wider institutional contexts that affect organizations 
(Christopher, 2010: 683). The VU case outlines events that do not accord with the agency 
theory view ‘that the board of directors is an information system that enables the stockholders 
within large corporations to monitor the opportunism of top executives’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59). 
Nor does the VU case reinforce the assumption of managerial theory ‘that boards of directors 
universally rubber stamp decisions by top management’ (Palmer et al., 1995: 487). We argue 
that managerialist and agency theories provide inadequate explanations of how agency was 
exercised in VU. Additionally, we reveal how social structures are constituted by human agency 
and, at the same time. are the very medium of this constitution. We draw attention to the 
capacity for agency theory to promote illusions about market sovereignty, democratic 
capitalism, and the answerability of corporations to their owners (Rowlinson et al., 2006). The 
VU case shows how conventional thinking regarding the separation of ownership and 
management in a large corporation can cloud understanding of the effective source and nature 
of corporate agency. 
The leadership of companies such as VU is influenced by a multiplicity of structures and 
mechanisms. Thus, multi-theoretical explanations of leader behavior are likely to be 
encompassing and insightful. Accordingly, we investigate the extent to which agency theory 
and managerial theory explain why Messier was replaced as CEO. In particular, we explore 
whether the board of directors was effective in monitoring Messier (agency theory) or whether 
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Messier was able to manage differences between directors to increase his power and control 
(managerial theory). Superficially at least, the removal of Messier seems attributable to the 
action of the board, thereby lending credence to an agency theory explanation. However, we 
argue that Messier was removed for less apparent reasons: the entrenched modus operandi of 
the French business establishment; the coalescing actions of a business elite; and the self-
interest of a long established shareholder family. We contend that the structure of inter-
personal relations, group dynamics and political intrigue between several directors, 
shareholders and other influential players, provides a strong plausible explanation for Messier’s 
removal and for the limits of his agency. Such structures and behaviors are treated as a ‘black 
box’ by agency theory (Tricker, 2012). 
We contribute to understanding leaders by presenting a broader view of agency. We do so 
in the context of a decision by a board of directors to support, or not support, an incumbent 
CEO. We show how the power of a CEO is not totally constrained, as functionalists contend. 
Furthermore, we reveal it is not absolute, as managerialists contend. We argue that the power 
of a CEO is relative, and that it can be mitigated. We show how the interests of an established 
elite and an ‘old guard’ can coalesce through kinship relations, interlocking directorships, and 
networks of influence. They create social structures that effect corporate control. Our narrative 
reveals how matters of national pride, personal prestige and social class can influence critical 
decisions regarding corporate leadership. We draw attention to a setting in which economic 
capital was not the only factor determining corporate control − social, cultural and symbolic 
capital were key elements too. 
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Our unfolding narrative introduces a cast that includes members of an ‘old boy’ network of 
former students of elite French schools, the Grand Écoles, and members of the elite grands 
corps of the French civil service. They were strongly patriotic businesspersons and politicians 
with an overriding commitment to maintain French culture, traditions and its ‘insider model’ of 
capitalism (Whittington and Mayer, 2000). Many of the ‘old boys’ were from the finance and 
banking industries. They were employed in four major networks of influence (centred on the 
insurance company AXA, and the banks BNP, Credit Lyonnaise and Société Générale). Other 
major players in our narrative are representatives of North American capital (the Bronfmans). 
Our central character, Messier (born in 1956), was an ‘old boy’ of a prominent Grand École. 
As a graduate of the prestigious École nationale d'administration [ENA], Messier was a member 
of an elite in France1 − one that was considered to be the ‘keeper of the flame’ of French 
capitalism. He had served in the elite grands corps of the French civil service and had strong 
links with the French finance industry. He shared a middle class background2 with some major 
influential establishment figures in France. Nonetheless, he was regarded widely by the French 
business and political establishment as a nouveau riche or parvenu (that is, as a relative 
newcomer to a socioeconomic class). The older generation of leaders of the French 
establishment, such as Bébéar (born in 1935, Chair of AXA, and reputed to be the ‘godfather’ of 
French business) and Fourtou (born in 1939), regarded Messier as an upstart who had come 
‘too far too soon’ (Ward, 2002: 210). 
The forced resignation of Messier in 2002 and the ensuing re-configuration of VU were 
controlled indirectly by a group of individuals who were not members of VU’s board of 
directors. Their shareholdings were below widely advocated proprietary cut-off points that are 
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claimed to indicate corporate agency or control (variously 20%, 10%, and 5%). We contend that 
control of VU was won because social structures and mechanisms allowed the established elite 
in France to collude with an influential ‘old guard’ family (the Bronfmans) and to create a locus 
of control that managerialism and agency theory each struggle to identify and explain. 
Messier’s removal as CEO represented the exercise of power ‘to achieve one’s subjective 
interests over others’ subjective interests’ and to ‘keep certain interests from getting on the 
agenda’ (Ron, 2008: 272; see also Lukes, 2005).  
We do not provide a comprehensive operational micro-analysis of the inner sanctum of 
corporate power and leadership. Rather, we analyse the dynamic interrelationship between 
structures and the agency of elite groups in their struggle for corporate control. We highlight 
the relationships between relevant social players and reveal how power and influence were 
exercised in the context of existing social structures.  
The following section outlines the facilitative analytical framework we use to elaborate on 
relevant aspects of managerialist and agency theories. We then outline our research method, 
before explaining the general business climate in which VU operated, and the broad 
circumstances of the control crisis at VU. Thereafter, we introduce the key players involved in 
the quest for control of VU (nouveau riche, old guard, and an established elite including 
members of the Institut Montaigne and Club Entreprises et Cités). We then explore the struggle 
for control by exposing some destabilizing factors that are critical in understanding the exercise 
of power. In the final section we enter conclusions.  
 
 
 8 
An analytical framework of corporate agency 
In this section we explore how agency arises, and how it can be empowered or limited. We 
assume readers are familiar with agency theory and its breadth of interpretation and 
application. Those wanting a fuller appreciation of agency theory should refer to the 
assessment and review provided by Eisenhardt (1989), and the overview provided by Shapiro 
(2005). 
The separation of ownership and control and the rise of agency 
Control or agency arises through the power to select board members; and thereby, to dictate 
corporate policy. Such a power is attributed to shareholders by agency theory. Managerialism 
attributes control to the CEO, in a context of ‘managerial capitalism’. 
Managerial capitalism was born in the 1920s according to Chabrak (2011) and Davis (2009). 
Big corporations began to be run by professional managers. They were less constrained by 
shareholders who increasingly had dispersed shareholdings. When US bankers largely withdrew 
from owning large corporations, and members of the general public flooded into the stock 
market during the 1920s, ownership became increasingly dispersed (Berle and Means ([1932] 
1982). Ownership became centrifugal with thousands of anonymous, powerless shareholders 
each owning no more than a tiny fraction of a company’s shares. Meanwhile, corporate control 
became centripetal, with the accession to power of the ‘organization man’ (Dahrendorf, 1972). 
Managerialism claims that as a consequence of managerial capitalism, control could no 
longer be exercised by an old guard of founding families, but was exercised by managerial elites 
(Galbraith, 1989). Mace (1971) describes how corporate executives became ascendant in the 
1960s: powerful CEOs determined who were board members, what boards could and could not 
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do, what information the board received, and how much senior executives (including 
themselves) were paid. Because top managers had the capacity to nominate a compliant board 
of directors and to abrogate control by shareholders, the board was viewed as a passive 
instrument of management control (Galbraith, 1989) and as a legal fiction (Clarke, 2007). Such a 
shift has been said to eliminate the former capitalist class by promoting a sort of ‘capitalism 
without capitalists’ (Dahrendorf, 1972). 
For Berle and Means ([1932] 1982), the corporation slipped imperceptibly and inevitably 
under management control once a cohesive ownership interest with at least a minimum 
specified proportion of the issued shares disappeared. The specified proprietary control cut-off 
point of 20% used in Berle and Means’ seminal study in 1932 of the 200 largest US companies 
has been replaced in more recent research by a 10% required minimum. However, this revised 
minimum cut-off point is contestable too: it does not discern some different modes of 
corporate control that are difficult to categorize (Zeitlin, 1974: 1090). Thus, any conclusion that 
control shifts to managers when share ownership falls below a specified minimum percentage 
is, in our view, questionable. 
We contend that the claim that agency in modern corporations has shifted from personal 
property ownership by wealthy families and business dynasties, to business bureaucracies, is 
overly simplistic. Our analysis in the case of VU takes account of social structures and 
mechanisms, and their effect on CEO agency. The structures we examine were created by the 
pattern of shareholdings and their evolution; the relationships between VU and other 
corporations and institutions; and the forms of personal union or interlocking relationship 
between corporate officers, directors, and principal shareholding families.  
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Duality of structure: social structures and the agency of corporate elites 
We use Giddens’ (1976) structuration theory to explain the relationship between individual 
actions and social structures. Our readings of Zeitlin (1974) and Palmer and Barber (2001) are 
informed by Giddens’ (1976: 121) ideas of duality of structure: that is, that ‘social structures are 
constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this 
constitution’ (Giddens, 1976: 121). 
According to Palmer and Barber (2001), the position of corporate elites is prescribed 
institutionally. Corporate elites attain power in a multidimensional social class structure as a 
consequence of their ownership of the means of production, the social status into which they 
are born, the educational credentials they attain, and their capacity to network socially with 
other elites. The desire of self-made corporate leaders to increase their wealth and social status 
was a strong motivator for the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1960s in the USA 
(Palmer and Barber, 2001). To pursue active corporate acquisition strategies successfully, and 
to exercise their agency fully, leaders needed to overcome social structures that resulted from 
the resistance (agency) of other social players (an old guard and an established elite). 
The old guard is composed of owning families. They are usually disinclined to engage in 
diversifying acquisitions (e.g., of the type pursued by VU) because of the threat to their current 
business interests (Palmer and Barber, 2001). The established elite is an inner group that 
defends the existing social and economic order. It comprises individuals who are embedded in 
social networks: they attend exclusive schools, frequent exclusive organizations and social 
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clubs, and serve on interlocking boards of directors. They do not necessarily come from families 
of high status (Palmer and Barber, 2001).  
Hence, for Palmer and Barber (2001), CEO agency is possible only if it is freed from social 
structures that result from the exercise of agency by other social actors. We contend that an 
individual’s social actions and agency are the synthesis of structures and agency. Thus, agency is 
not simply a function of an individual’s expression of will. Furthermore, it is not constrained by 
the incommensurable forces of social structures. Rather, agency is influenced by structures. 
These structures are not (metaphorical) ‘steel frames,’ but are socially constructed. They are 
produced, maintained and adapted through the exercise of agency by social actors. 
Zeitlin (1974) offers good account of how the agency of corporate elites creates structures 
and mechanisms that limit CEO agency. These elites take advantage of interlocking 
directorships, and other networks, to do so. He argues that the web of kinship relations that 
unites apparently unrelated individuals forming boards of directors, helps to determine 
corporate agency and control. He adds that central to developing an understanding of such 
control is the need to appreciate the connections between directors and banks; and whether a 
family sphere of influence exists through various personal and business connections, 
complicated business structures, and other ‘eleemosynary [charitable] arrangements’ (Zeitlin, 
1974: 1098). Consistent with this view, a family-dominated business dynasty can be more 
resilient than managerialism would suggest. It can exercise control at lower (percentage) levels 
of proprietary ownership by virtue of strong kinship networks. Thus, a small proportion of 
shares in the hands of an influential family can carry different control potential than if held by a 
single individual with no other major resources and supporting institutions (Zeitlin, 1974: 1098–
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99). In this vein, La Porta et al. (1999: 502) provide evidence that ‘families often have control 
rights over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights.’ Thus, strong family 
relationships should be viewed as powerful forms of capital, and as having the potential to be 
critical influences in the quest for control of a company (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
Drawing on Zeitlin (1974), we argue that some influential social actors (the old guard and 
the business elite), in their exercise of agency, create structural limitations on CEO agency. 
Method 
We embed our study of the leadership change at VU in a deeper study of preceding events. We 
rely on a wide array of publicly available information, including VU’s published annual (and 
other publicly available) reports, and press releases issued by VU and the French Capital 
Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers). From these sources we compiled financial 
and corporate governance data (e.g., VU’s capital structure from 2000 to 2004; and the 
composition of VU’s board of directors before and after the resignation of Messier). We used a 
cartographic approach, similar to that of Chabrak (2012, Table 3), to understand the networks 
of influence in French capitalism.  
Our qualitative research methods (including document analysis procedures) follow the 
principles outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994): that is, in respect of data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Our method involved observing data related 
to the phenomenon at issue (the resignation of Messier); developing conjectures to explain that 
phenomenon (analytical framework); and then collecting data to confirm or refute them 
(Blaikie, 2007). The first and third authors, as residents of Paris, were first-hand observers of 
the leadership control crisis at VU. They worked together, independently of the second author, 
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to form initial assessments. These were moderated subsequently by the second author, until a 
consensus view was reached. 
Secondary data were accessed from a variety of conventional bibliographic sources, 
including scholarly journals (some accessed using Google Scholar), Internet websites (e.g., of 
NYSE Euronext), and French and American newspapers and periodicals (e.g., le Monde, Time, 
Vanity Fair, and New York Times). We draw contextualizing information from a widely cited 
biography of Messier by Orange and Johnson (2004) and from a case study of the (so-called) 
‘rescue’ of VU (Rebiere 2004). Secondary data were analysed concurrently with primary data to 
corroborate the factual content of statements derived from document analysis. Almost all data 
sources were read separately by at least two authors.  
This study’s interpretive nature renders it prudent for readers to be mindful that the social 
situation documented is complex and fraught with a ‘plurality of plausible explanations’ (Ron, 
2008: 291). Thus, we make no claim that the explanations offered are necessarily better than 
any other. We rely on a conception of objectivity that has been endorsed widely in the social 
sciences. We recognize that there are no pure facts in social research. Nonetheless, our findings 
appear to be consistent with our concepts and theorising. Readers should be mindful that 
knowledge is constructed socially, that the views we present of the social world are a matter of 
intersubjective agreement; and knowledge is an interpretation which is subject to social 
controls, criticism by peers, and social negotiation (Blaikie, 2007). Thus, if objectivity is 
construed as a critically achieved consensus of the scientific community, then our results should 
be considered tentative and open to revision. 
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The control crisis at Vivendi Universal 
Throughout the 1990s, media conglomerates such as VU engaged in cross-industry mergers, 
acquisitions and strategic alliances to obtain stronger competitive positions. Their actions were 
facilitated by government deregulation of the telecommunications industry, digitalization in 
telecommunications, and competition in satellite, cable, analog and digital terrestrial diffusion.  
By 2000, the media market in the US and Europe had become dominated by large, 
integrated, diversified companies (Time Warner, Disney-ABC, Viacom-CBS, News Corp, Sony 
and Bertelsmann). These companies served diverse audiences through multiple distribution 
channels and multiple technologies. They acquired complementary assets and pursued vertical 
integration. They acquired content-production capacity, distribution capacity, and the right to 
market consumer electronic devices. In 2000, the mergers of Vivendi with Universal (to form 
VU), and AOL with Time Warner (to form AOL Time Warner [AOLTW]) were prominent 
examples of global multimedia convergence strategies. However, the VU and AOLTW mergers 
were both deemed to be failures (Bodie, 2006: 975). To understand the main reasons for the 
failure of the VU merger, and whether the strategic thinking underlying it was a valid reason for 
Messier’s removal, it is important to first explore how VU developed and expanded. 
VU emerged from a French water and waste management utility whose core business had 
been conducted by Compagnie Générale des Eaux [CGE] since 1853. CGE adopted the name 
Vivendi in 1998 when Jean-Marie Messier became its Chair. Messier quickly made his mark. In 
July 2002, he was announced as Time magazine’s person of the week. He was portrayed as ‘a 
former water company executive who became a French business celebrity by turning a sleepy 
water utility … [CGE] into a $51 billion global media giant, Vivendi Universal’ (Coatney, 2002). 
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Messier accelerated CGE’s diversification by making significant investments in mobile telephony 
and new media technologies. Major events in the history of VU are summarized in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
In June 2000, Vivendi acquired Universal Studios in Hollywood through its purchase of the 
Canadian alcoholic beverages producer, Seagram. This gave Vivendi interests in movie 
production, cinema operation and music rights. The merged company, Vivendi Universal [VU], 
became the world’s second largest media group after Time Warner. Thus, a French company 
became owner of a major American movie studio and the world’s principal music publisher. The 
merger made strategic sense because of the vertical integration between content (the 
contributions of Universal and Canal+ on film, music, fiction, documentary, and video games) 
and distribution (television, Vizzavi portal, mobile phones).3 The integration was intended to 
develop economies of scope between all divisions of VU and to take advantage of many 
strategic possibilities.4 
Messier’s leadership riled the French establishment: it perceived him to be an ambitious, 
garrulous showman who courted celebrity status (Clark, 2004). For his part, Messier alleges 
‘prominent members of the French business establishment’ conspired against him (Clark, 
2004). Messier did not endear himself to many ordinary French people. He confronted French 
pride and nationalism. He dismissed ‘French cultural exception’, embraced English as the official 
language of VU, and advocated the adoption of American business culture (see Dickerson, 
2003: 1046). 
By 2002, VU had sustained severe financial losses. The ‘halo effect’ described by 
Rosenzweig (2007) was at play. VU’s good performance in prior years was attributed to its 
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allegedly visionary and charismatic CEO. Evaluation of bad performance was biased in a similar 
fashion. Generally, observers formed an opposite conclusion –the same CEO now viewed as 
arrogant. The halo effect seems to have lingered, at least partially, because although Messier 
was blamed for the bad performance, the general strategic direction he set for the company 
was not implicated by his critics in their blame. Messier’s forced resignation as CEO on June 30, 
2002 raises many issues regarding corporate agency and control. We contend his resignation 
was not prompted by strategic mistakes on his part, or by any compelling force of unacceptable 
accounting performance measures. Rather, we contend it was the consequence of social 
structures and mechanisms involving kinship relationships, interlocking directorships, and 
business alliances that resulted from the exercise of agency by corporate elites. In explaining 
our contention, we focus on a nouveau riche (Messier), an old guard influential shareholder 
family (Bronfmans), and an established elite (influential directors).5  
Messier’s removal as CEO is analyzed in the context of the long tradition of French 
companies of sharing the services of their CEOs reciprocally through interlocking board 
memberships. In 1999, 50% of French corporations were involved in reciprocal interlocking 
directorships (Yeo et al., 2003). Persons appointed to two, three, or more corporate boards 
were part of an inner-circle of elite persons who were more likely to have attended the ‘right’ 
schools, belonged to the ‘right’ clubs, and be from the ‘right’ social background. In 1995, 23 
elite persons held 214 board directorships in France and exerted strong control over companies 
composing the CAC 40 (Kadushin, 1995: 203).  
We identify four networks of influence among the French directors. These centered on the 
insurance company AXA (founded by Bébéar) and three large banks, as follows: 
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• AXA network: including Bébéar, Breton (Thomson), Fourtou (Aventis), Lachman 
(Schneider), François-Poncet (BNP Paribas). 
• BNP network: including Pébereau, Bébéar, (AXA), Beffa (Saint-Gobain), Friedman (UAP), 
Messier (VU), Owen-Jones (L’Oréal). 
• Société Générale network: including Bouton, Tchuruk (Alcatel), Messier (Vivendi 
Universal), Desmarest (TotalFina-Elf), Viénot. 
• Crédit Lyonnais network: including Lagardère (Lagardère), Bouygues (Bouygues). 
It is common practice for links between elite educational institutions and major financial 
and industrial companies to be exploited to protect French corporations from hostile attacks by 
institutional investors (Whittington and Mayer, 2000). The French elite, from the prestigious 
Grandes Écoles and les corps de l’Etat, benefited from government-supported institutional 
arrangements that encouraged cross-shareholdings and interlocking board directorships 
(Whittington and Mayer, 2000). However, from about the end of the 1990s, the pressure 
exerted by institutional investors diluted the level of cross-shareholdings (Morin, 2009). 
Key Players 
Nouveau riche and old guard  
Messier was born into a family of modest status in Grenoble in 1956, the son of a chartered 
accountant and the grandson of a chauffeur (Orange and Johnson, 2004). He progressed to 
study at the École Polytechnique (X), and the École nationale d'administration [ENA]. After 
appointments in the French Economics Ministry during the 1980s, and at the Lazard Frères 
investment bank in 1989, he joined CGE in 1994, becoming its chair in 1998. (For a fuller 
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biography see the Encyclopedia of Business, 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/biography/M-R/Messier-Jean-Marie-1956.html). 
The established elite frowned on Messier because of the turbulence he instigated. In 2001, 
Messier’s annual income was estimated at €5.1 million. He flaunted his wealth. He was accused 
of arrogance and social climbing. His relationship with actress Sophie Marceau, his private A319 
Airbus, and his luxurious penthouse in New York, were the subject of many articles in French 
newspapers and magazines. When in New York, Messier behaved like a show business 
celebrity, much to the chagrin of the French business elite. He explained his behavior as over-
compensation for the shyness he suffered in his youth (Jean-Marie Messier: les six mois de 
chute, Le Monde, 2 July 2002, http://www.lemonde.fr/).6 
In 2000, the creation of VU with a share market capitalization of €100 billion heralded the 
arrival on the VU share register of a very wealthy and influential family, the Bronfmans. They 
had prospered largely because of the business acumen of Samuel Bronfman (1889-1971) and 
the large fortune he made in Canada in the alcoholic distilled beverage business. Samuel 
married Saidye Rosner (1897-1995) in 1922. Their four children were all well-connected and 
influential.7 The Bronfmans were substantial philanthropists, committed to advancing social, 
cultural and educational causes, principally in Canada. They funded the Bronfman Building at 
McGill University (1971), created the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada (1993), and 
donated the Seagram Building in Montreal to McGill University (2002). The Bronfman family 
was also prominent in campaigns to compensate victims of the Holocaust.  
Prior to 2000, the family had been the majority owner of Seagram, a diversified 
conglomerate. However, at the instigation of its CEO, Edgar Bronfman Jr., Seagram expanded 
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into entertainment and music. In 2000, it agreed with Vivendi to create Vivendi Universal. As 
part of this deal, 59% of Seagram’s capital was transferred to shareholders of Vivendi, 12% 
became owned by shareholders of Canal+, and 29% by shareholders of Seagram. Eight per cent 
of the share capital of VU, and eight seats on the VU board of directors, were allocated to the 
Bronfman family. This made them the dominant shareholder of VU in 2000. Importantly, the 
creation of VU made Edgar Bronfman Jr. and Jean-Marie Messier business associates. Both 
dreamt of building a world media colossus. Both shared a vision of diversification and 
expansion into the entertainment industry. They were men of similar ambitions, but from 
different social spheres. 
Edgar Bronfman Jr. had a passion for the entertainment business. At an early age, he was a 
film and Broadway producer and a songwriter. He was keen to shift Seagram’s interests from 
alcoholic beverages to media. In 1993, based on his advice, Seagram acquired 15% of Time 
Warner. In 1995, Edgar Jr. convinced the family to resell his 24% stake in the DuPont Company 
to fund the purchase of Universal Studios from Matsushita Electric. 
For his part, Messier dreamt of founding a company that ‘could be the world's preferred 
creator and provider of personalized information, entertainment and services to consumers 
anywhere, at any time and across all distribution platforms and devices’ (Coatney, 2002). On 13 
October 2000, Messier declared proudly that ‘the old Vivendi group had died’ and that, because 
of the merger with Seagram, a French company had entered the ‘forbidden city’ of Hollywood 
(Les cinq métiers du nouveau géant, Le Monde, 16 October 2000, http://www.lemonde.fr/). 
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Established elites: Institut Montaigne and Club Entreprises et Cités 
In 1983, Bébéar (assisted principally by Lachman) created Club Entreprises et Cités to lobby for 
private enterprise. This ‘club’ brought together strong supporters of free market ideology. In 
1986, with the formation of a right wing government by Jacques Chirac, the club participated 
actively in the wave of privatizations of major French companies and banks.  
The privately funded Institut Montaigne was a self-proclaimed liberal (here meaning pro-
conservative, pro-business) think-tank created by Bébéar in 2000, funded by about 80 French 
companies.8 Institut Montaigne’s members included powerful CEOs (such as Lachman, Fourtou 
and Bébéar), public personalities, academics and representatives of the civil society — all of 
whom wanted to influence public policy issues in France. The members comprised about 30 of 
the most influential CEOs in the French business world.  
There was strong solidarity between members of Club Entreprises et Cités. At the time of 
Messier’s resignation, five French directors of the VU board were members. In September 
2002, when Fourtou, as the newly-installed CEO, sold VU’s interests in Canal+ Technologies to 
Thomson Multimedia for €190 million, many analysts concluded that the price had been 
underestimated − a few months later Canal+ Technologies was resold by Thomson Multimedia 
for a gain of €110 million. Some analysts have described this as an exchange of gifts between 
two members of Club Entreprises et Cités, Fourtou and Breton (Rebiere, 2004). 
 
The Control of VU: Beyond three apparent destabilizing factors 
The first apparent destabilizing factor after VU’s merger with Seagram was its announcement of 
accounting losses of €13.6 billion in 2001 and €23.3 billion in 2002. These were then the worst 
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ever reported losses for a French company. They were due, in part, to asset acquisitions made 
by Messier (about €100 billion), flagging sales revenues, and the bursting of the dot-com bubble 
in 2000-01. The losses shook investor confidence and raised doubts about the sagacity of VU’s 
convergence strategy. However, in Messier’s defence, VU’s reported accounting losses were 
attributable, in part, to a global, industry-wide phenomenon. They were not a primary 
consequence of Messier’s leadership. Indeed, in 2002, VU’s major international competitor, 
AOLTW, recorded a loss of about $US100 billion − the largest loss ever posted (to that time by 
a US company.  
The accounting results reported in 2002 by AOLTW and VU reflect the similar problems 
both companies experienced after the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2000-01. The return 
on equity [defined as Reported Net Profit ÷ Total Shareholders’ Funds] for both companies 
followed a similar pattern over the years 2000 to 2002: 
Return on Equity 
Company 2000 2001 2002 
VU  4.06% -37.00% -166.00% 
AOLTW -2.78%   -3.25% -186.86% 
 
Published balance sheets for each company reveal a similar collapse in total shareholders’ 
equity during their 2002 financial years: 62% for VU, and 65% for AOLTW. In the case of 
AOLTW, poor financial performance was attributed to the difficulty of achieving synergies 
between AOL (new economy) and Time Warner (old economy). 
In VU’s case, the French establishment elite used the poor financial results to campaign for 
Messier’s ousting. However, Messier’s ultimate removal was not because his strategy of 
convergence was folly. Indeed, his ousting did not lead to a change in the company’s strategic 
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choice of a policy of convergence. A major (though largely unstated) motive for his removal 
seemed linked to the fact that the merger to form VU involved a merger with American 
interests.9 This presented important sovereignty issues to the French – issues that were 
particularly galling in view of the insensitivity of a class-hopping nouveau riche, Messier. Indeed, 
subsequent to Messier’s removal, VU decided to sell its new American assets to focus on core 
business. However, it did not change Messier’s overriding strategic policy. This lends credence 
to contention that the interests of the Bronfmans and the French business elite coalesced to 
remove what they regarded to be a dangerous de-stabilizing influence. The Bronfmans wanted 
to preserve their wealth. The French establishment wanted to preserve French capitalism and 
culture. Messier’s removal was not the result of a market governance mechanism that acted in 
the way suggested by agency theorists. Rather, it arose more from Messier’s role in bringing 
unwanted turbulence to the established interests of a corporate elite. 
The role that the published accounting results played in influencing the board’s decision is 
consistent with the ‘ammunition machine’ metaphor proposed by Burchell et al. (1980): that is, 
accounting information was used to support a political process ‘by which and through which 
interested parties [promoted] their own particular interests’ (p.15). The organizational setting 
at VU conformed to many of the characteristics Burchell et al. (1980) suggest coincide with the 
use of accounting in such a role: there was a conflict over basic orientations and the means to 
achieve ends; and there were coalitions of interest.  
A second alleged destabilizing factor was that rumors and short selling in June 2002 caused 
a sharp decline in VU’s share price. On June 24, 2002, VU shares lost 23.3%, closing at €18.75. 
However, this decline should be analyzed in the context that, in 2002, the French stock market 
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index, CAC 40, lost 33.75%. The decline was 19.9% on June 24 alone.10 At a meeting of the 
board of directors held three days later, Messier was under pressure.11 Financial magazines and 
newspapers accentuated a wave of panic by propagating rumors. Many commentators 
maintain there was an orchestrated putsch for Messier to resign at the board meeting on June 
27, 2002 (La Bourse de Paris au plus bas depuis septembre 2001, Le Monde, 26 June 2002, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/). Messier resigned three days later. 
A third misleading destabilizing factor was that, from the first half of 2002, the board of 
directors (see Table 2) announced its concern about the failure of VU to realize the expected 
synergies of its convergence with Seagram.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
The board declared that it had negotiated additional financial facilities from banks on June 
28. Those negotiations were made easier because Société Générale and BNP Paribas were 
committed heavily to VU; and because two directors of VU were honorary presidents of these 
banks (Thomas at BNP Paribas; Viénot at Société Générale). However, and importantly, the 
financial facilitation VU received was made on one condition: that Messier should resign.12 This 
pressuring tactic was applied by the French business elite. They campaigned to persuade the 
VU board that it would never get operational control of American assets; and that those assets 
should be sold to American interests to preserve Vivendi Environnement (that is, CGE).13  
 
Messier’s agency and the agency of an established elite and old guard: duality of structure  
Fourtou’s appointment as CEO was the culmination of a putsch orchestrated by the Bronfman 
family and Bébéar. This was facilitated by the kinship of apparently unrelated directors. As 
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shown in Table 3, VU’s board of directors was dominated by members of the Club Entreprises et 
Cités, a conservative business lobby group. The agency of the Bronfman family and Bébéar 
imposed structural limitations on Messier exercising his agency fully. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The influence of the Bronfman family cannot be appreciated fully if we use the 
managerialist criterion of 10% of share ownership as the indicator of control. It would be better 
to establish their control by using Burch’s (1972) criteria: family members were affluent and 
held 4% to 5% or more of the voting shares; and family members were on the board of 
directors over an extended period of time (see Table 4).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
However, regardless of their small proportion of VU’s shares, we argue that the Bronfman 
family’s agency became a decisive factor in creating structural limitations on Messier’s agency 
and his capacity to effect VU policies and its reconfiguration. This is particularly the case when 
their interests and actions coalesced with those of Bébéar and his factional allies on the board. 
Although VU’s directors were apparently unrelated individuals, in reality they were connected 
by close kinship relations. This empowered their agency and their capacity to influence Messier. 
In accord with the explanation given by Zeitlin (1974; 1989), VU directors were either from (or 
associated with) large banks and insurance companies. Generally, in France, large banks and 
insurance companies hold stakes in large corporations and are represented on boards of 
directors. Those boards also contain many influential individuals and families as principal 
shareholders. Thus, they often contain a small circle of persons with the capacity to exert 
concentrated power because of their community of interests.  
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In 2001, under Messier’s leadership, there were 19 directors. The 12 French directors 
included some very influential personalities in the French business world (see Table 2). The 
large VU board made it easier for Messier to manage any antagonism and reinforce his control. 
At this time, Messier was at the heart of a network of 39 directors and some loosely coupled 
sub-networks (Guieu and Meschi, 2008). However, after his resignation in 2002, the only 
significant network that remained was composed of Pébereau, Fourtou, Breton, Roger, Bébéar, 
Roulet, Poncet, Friedmann, Calvet and Lachmann (Guieu and Meschi, 2008). Bébéar, Friedman 
and Pébereau were members of the French finance industry. Lachmann, the former CEO of 
Schneider Electric, was a close friend of Bébéar and Chirac and shared a love of rugby with 
Bébéar. Of the other French members of the board in 2003, Bébéar, Fourtou and Collomb had 
each attended École Polytechnique (X), the most prestigious school in the unique French system 
of Grandes Écoles.14 Attendance at this school had a history of leading to membership of the 
elite grands corps of the French civil service (Corps des Mines, Conseil d'État, Cour des comptes 
and the Inspection générale des finances) − breeding grounds for the ‘inner group’ (Kadushin, 
1995; Campbell 2014). 
Two other factors were critical in defining friendships in the inner group: political 
tendencies, and class solidarity (Kadushin, 1995). Messier’s replacement, Fourtou, had been a 
close friend of Bébéar for more than 30 years.15 Fourtou and Bébéar were born and raised in 
Gascogny in the south-west of France. They shared common passions for gastronomy, wine and 
rugby. Bébéar successfully championed Fourtou to succeed Messier in spite of opposition from 
the Corps des Inspecteurs de Finance, a state audit supervisory body. 
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Lachman, Fourtou and Bébéar had many influential friends in common, including Serge 
Kampf (Capgemini), Michel Pébereau (BNP Paribas), Thierry Breton (former CEO of Thomson 
and France Télécom), Daniel Bernard (former CEO of Carrefour), Gérard Mestrallet (Suez), and 
Martin Bouygues (Bouygues). These friends had many opportunities to caucus informally and to 
discuss business-related matters. They often met at the opera or the theatre. Every winter the 
many rugby fans among them were invited by Serge Kampf and Pierre Dauzier, ex-owner of 
Havas (a multinational communications group), to fly in private jets with the former champion 
rugby player, Jean-Pierre Rives, to watch Six Nations Championship rugby games.16 Many dined 
together regularly. The choice of Fourtou to replace Messier was unsurprising in view of 
findings that boards are likely to appoint CEOs who ‘resemble themselves’ so as to be able to 
‘rely on demographic similarity as a way to reduce [performance] ambiguity and [social] 
uncertainty’ (Zajac and Westphal, 1996: 84). 
The Bébéar clan, an arm of the established elite, was committed to the good functioning 
and protection of French capitalism. Members of the clan viewed Messier as a threat to their 
interests because he had been prepared to dispense with established cultural and economic 
values to pursue a broader strategy of global convergence.17 The turbulence he brought to the 
Parisian business world was viewed as dangerous and his agency (his capacity to act) was 
inhibited by the structures resulting from the established elite and the old guard exercise of 
agency. 
 
The replacement of Messier 
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Throughout the period of destabilization, Messier disregarded criticism of his leadership. He 
presented VU’s poor reported accounting performance as a logical consequence of the bursting 
of the dot-com bubble. He held Canal+ responsible for the group’s poor financial performance 
and forced its popular CEO (Pierre Lescure) to resign on 16 April 2002. However, the firing of 
Lescure ‘wakened a sleeping giant in the form of venerable French businessman Claude Bébéar, 
who decided that urgent intervention was needed …’ (Ward, 2002: 210). 
Although Messier had managed cultural differences between the North American and 
French directors well for two years, in 2002 he became overly confident. During the 2002 
General Assembly, President Chirac stated publicly that Vivendi Environnement should remain 
French. Messier committed to do so. However, Messier reneged, despite concerted pressure by 
the Minister of Finance (Laurent Fabius), and lobbying by André Santini (trade union leader) and 
Jean-Paul Delevoye (President of the Association of French Mayors). VU’s ownership of Vivendi 
Environnement fell to just below 50% in April 2002, and to 20.4% in December 2002.18 Two 
days after Messier resigned as CEO, Chirac declared that Messier was no longer a ‘desirable 
person’ in the Elysée.19 
Messier’s tenure as CEO was rendered fragile by a significant change in the internal 
dynamic of the board. On 27 June 2002, with the share price in decline, a strong supporter of 
Messier, Bernard Arnault (CEO of LVMH), resigned. This compounded Messier’s difficulties in 
controlling the board because four other directors who had supported him (Jean-Louis Beffa, 
René Thomas, Philippe Foriel-Destezet and Pierre Lescure) had left the board earlier in the year. 
The board was now balanced evenly with 7 French directors (including Messier) and 7 foreign 
directors. This encouraged the foreign directors to propose Messier’s replacement by Edgar 
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Bronfman Jr.. Messier’s response was to appeal to French patriotism by brandishing the French 
flag (metaphorically) in the face of the Bronfman family. He rallied the French directors to 
protect the company’s French interests (Rebiere, 2004). 
Messier’s numerous enemies were very concerned about his insensitivity to Gallic pride 
and culture. His declaration that English should be VU’s official language and his advocacy of 
American business culture for VU, were highly inflammatory (Ward, 2002: 209). His view that 
this ‘French cultural exception’ was outdated was at odds with the deep rooting of this principle 
in French psyche. It dismayed many French people, including many in the French entertainment 
industry, and French President Jacques Chirac (Coatney, 2002; Ward, 2002: 209). However, 
perhaps worse was Messier’s announcement before the French Federal Communications 
Commission that he would discontinue funding support for the French cinema. 
Seemingly convinced that the century-long dynasty built by Samuel Bronfman was about to 
crumble because of the fall of VU’s share price, the Bronfmans started regarded Messier and 
his convergence strategy as a suitable scapegoat for their ills.20 They allegedly asked an 
American law firm (Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz) to inform the French directors of 
VU that they risked a class action lawsuit against them if they continued supporting Messier, 
while their actual strategy was to conspire with them (notably Bébéar allies in the board) to 
remove Messier as CEO.  
After a board meeting on 29 May 2002, a governance committee was created, co-chaired 
by Edgar Bronfman Jr. and Marc Viénot (a French director co-opted by Messier). At the same 
time, Samuel Mintzberg (a board representative of one of two branches of the Bronfman 
family) collaborated with Bébéar to orchestrate Messier’s resignation. Mintzberg advised 
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Bébéar that the Bronfman’s had agreed that Jean-René Fourtou should replace Messier 
(Rebiere, 2004). In their compaign against Messier, the Bronfmans and Bébéar were supported 
by the two French directors of VU who were factional allies of Bébéar (Jean-Marc Espalioux 
[Accor] and Henri Lachmann [Schneider]).  
On June 27, the French directors met after being informed that Moodys intended to lower 
the rating of VU securities to junk bond status. During this meeting, Marc Viénot and Jacques 
Friedman changed their allegiance: they no longer supported Messier. Serge Tchuruk, the CEO 
of Alcatel was the last director to support Messier. The board of directors asked Messier to 
resign as CEO in favour of Fourtou (whose appointment had been supported by the cabinet of 
Prime Minister, Raffarin). Messier resigned on June 30, 2002 on condition that he be awarded 
$20 million to help refund a loan of $25 million he had taken out to purchase shares of VU 
(Rebiere, 2004). Fourtou, a close friend of Bébéar, was then appointed CEO of VU. Bébéar was 
put in charge of the Finance Committee. Lachman was appointed to chair the Strategy 
Committee. Members of the influential Club Entreprises et Cités now dominated the board of 
directors. 
Fourtou disposed of some non-strategic assets of VU. This yielded €24.6 billion in three 
years.21 He invested €24.1 billion in other businesses. The group reduced its net financial debt 
by about €20 billion. VU continued to be a major company in media and telecommunications. 
Importantly, Fourtou did not change the strategic orientation Messier had adopted – apart 
from transferring 80% of VU’s interests in Vivendi Universal Entertainment to NBC in 2004. This 
reduced VU’s financial debt by a further €5.3 billion and gave VU a 20% interest in NBC, valued 
at €4.9 billion (VU annual reports for 2002, 2003, 2004, http://www.amf-france.org/). 
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Conclusions  
This paper can be located in that part of the leadership literature which contends that 
corporate power and agency is not concentrated absolutely in the hands of leaders, but is 
dispersed widely, and can be marshalled by non-leaders and leaders (Tourish, 2014, p.80). As 
such, an implicit message is that we should be less inclined to view leaders as at the “centre of 
more or less solid hierarchies and stable networks”, but instead regard their agency as 
ephemeral, and fashioned by “fluid social structures” and “particular social, organisational and 
temporal contexts” (Tourish, 2014, pp. 79-80). We alluded in the opening of our paper to the 
leader-centric accounts of agency that are a key feature of transformational leadership 
theories. In even more blatant form, such approaches feed into populist narratives that seek to 
identify ‘the top performing CEOs’ in any given year, and which assume a direct causal 
connection between CEO intentions and organizational performance (e.g., Ignatius, 2014). Our 
paper challenges such perspectives. In the VU case, the actions of the old guard and established 
elite highlight the potential to regard non-leaders “as knowledgeable and proactive agents with 
multiple prospects for action and deep vestiges of power at their disposal” (Tourish, 2014, 
p.88). 
Messier’s removal as CEO of VU reveals how agency can be constrained by social structures 
and a larger political environment. These constraints can severely disrupt leaders’ ability to 
exercise power, and retain their post.22 The VU case provides a more balanced view of agency – 
one that is consistent with Giddens’ (1976) ‘duality of structure’ explanation. We reveal the 
importance of social structures and mechanisms, such as networks of influence (family, friends, 
and access to capital), appeals to patriotism, and inflamed prejudices (e.g., against a nouveau 
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riche), that result from the exercise of agency by other influential social actors. We draw 
attention to the limitations of quantitatively deterministic ‘rules of thumb’ to indicate the locus 
of effective agency. We highlight the potential for leader agency to be mediated by ‘national 
cultural identity’ and entrenched national ‘modes of doing business.’ 
Understanding the forces that influenced the resignation of Messier provides insight to 
features of corporate agency that have been under-researched. The interests of the old guard 
Bronfman family coincided with those of the established elite. This commonality of interests 
shifted the locus of control to the wealthy Bronfman family (despite it owning less than 5% of 
the voting share capital) and the Bébéar clan (despite most of its members not being board 
directors). Thus, the emerging picture is of two groups of capitalists whose interests were 
mutually dependent and intertwined. They exercised power to shape social and political 
conditions in a way that suited them.  
The joint use of power by an old guard family and an established business elite was 
instrumental in limiting Messier agency. Each party promoted their subjective interests. The 
French established elite wanted to keep France free of the polluting effects of Americanization 
of French business practice, and the abandonment of policies of French cultural exception. The 
Bronfmans wanted to protect the century-long dynasty built by Samuel Bronfman. Once, they 
colluded, the resulting structures and mechanisms ‘set in motion … worked quickly’ to oust 
Messier (Ward, 2002: 212). 
Understanding of the control struggle at VU should not overlook the importance of the 
exploitation of class relationships. The VU case draws attention to circumstances in which 
economic capital is not the sole determinant of the winners of power struggles. Other forms of 
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capital (such as social capital) were crucial in ceding control of VU to persons who did not hold a 
major interest in the group capital or who were not involved in VU’s governance. We should 
recognize too that financial accounts and reports had diminished revelatory potential. They did 
not enable potential or existing shareholders, customers or employees to learn much about the 
tussle for control of the company. As a consequence, many shareholders with large holdings 
were at an information and power disadvantage — unless, like many of the leading characters 
in the preceding narrative, they were able to take advantage of ‘the right connections.’  
In terms of leadership theory and pedagogy, the VU case stresses that leaders are often 
embedded in, or subject to, dense networks of influence that either inhibit or enhance their 
agency and capacity for action. This important feature of leadership contexts is often 
underplayed in theorizing about, and in teaching, leadership. It is important to have regard for 
the view that individual actions of leaders arise from a synthesis of social structures and agency. 
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Table 1. Major Events in the History of Vivendi Universal to 2004 
Date Event 
1853 
>1900 
1983 
1987 
1998  
2000  
2000  
 
 
2001 
2002  
 
 
2002 
2003  
2003  
  
2004  
Compagnie Générale des Eaux [CGE] forms to supply water in Paris.  
CGE diversifies into waste management, transport, energy, real estate and communication.  
CGE participates in the creation of Canal+, the first premium pay TV channel in France. 
Société française de radiotéléphone [SFR] is created. 
Messier becomes Chair of CGE. The group takes the name of Vivendi. 
Vivendi agrees to launch the Vizzavi Internet portal with Vodafone Airtouch.  
Vivendi Universal [VU] created through a merger of Vivendi’s media interests with Canal+ TV networks 
and Universal Studios (purchased from Seagram). The company’s water, waste management and 
transport operations become Vivendi Environnement. 
Edgar Bronfman Jr. resigns as vice-president of VU.    
VU acquires the entertainment assets of USA Networks and merges them with Universal Studios to 
form Vivendi Universal Entertainment [VUE]. Assets are sold in publishing, Tele+, Canal+ Technologies, 
Vinci, Vizzavi, EchoStar Communications, Vivendi Environnement. 
Messier resigns and is replaced by Fourtou.  
VU increases to 70% its ownership of the French telephone operator, Groupe SFR-Cegetel  
VU and General Electric [GE] combine the National Broadcasting Company [NBC] and VUE to form NBC 
Universal [NBCU]. 
VU and GE agree to an 80% divestiture of VU’s interest in VUE, and a concurrent acquisition of a 20% 
interest in NBC. VU retains a 20% voting interest, and an 18.5% ownership interest, in NBCU. 
Sources: Annual reports of Vivendi and Time Warner, Datamonitor, media industry profiles, business press reports. 
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Table 2. VU Board of Directors in 2001 
Members Positions 
French (12) 
Jean-Marie Messier 
Pierre Lescure* 
Eric Licoys 
Bernard Arnault* 
Jean Louis Beffa* 
Jean Marc Espalioux 
Philippe Foriel-Destezet* 
Jacques Friedman  
Henri Lachmann 
Serge Tchuruk 
René Thomas* 
Marc Viénot 
 
Foreign (7) 
Edgar Bronfman Jr.  
Edgar M Bronfman  
Richard H Brown  
Esther Koplowitz  
Marie-Josée Kravis  
Samuel Minzberg  
Simon Murray  
 
CEO, VU 
CEO, Canal+ and Executive Officer of VU 
Executive Officer, VU 
CEO, LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton 
CEO, la Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 
CEO, Accor 
Founder, Ecco 
CEO, UAP 
CEO, Schneider Electric 
CEO, Alcatel 
Honorary President, BNP Paribas 
Honorary President, la Société Générale 
 
 
CEO, VU Canada Inc 
President, Samuel Bronfman Foundation, Inc  
President, Electronic Data Systems 
Reputedly the richest person in Spain 
Member, US Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board 
CEO, Claridge Inc. 
Chair, Simon Murray and Associates (BVI) 
* Directors who left the board prior to Messier’s resignation.  Source: VU annual report, 2001 
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Table 3. Vivendi Board of Directors after Fourtou became CEO 
Members Positions Replacing 
French (6) 
Jean-René Fourtou  
 
 
Claude Bébéar  
 
 
Gérard Brémond  
 
Bertrand Collomb  
 
Dominique Hoenn*  
Henri Lachmann 
 
Foreign (6) 
Edgar Bronfman Jr ¥ 
Edgar Bronfman¥ 
Fernando F. de Córdova  
Paul Fribourg  
Gerard Kleisterlee   
Marie-Josée Kravis 
 
CEO, VU. Born south west France. Friend of Bébéar with whom he 
managed UDF Party finances. Former member, Club Entreprises et Cités. 
Graduate, Polytechnique (X). 
Born south west France. Former CEO, AXA. Founder, Institut du mécénat 
de solidarité, Institut Montaigne, and Club Entreprises et Cités. Graduate, 
Polytechnique (X). 
CEO, Pierre et Vacances. Former member, Club Entreprises et Cités. Chair, 
Lafarge.  
President, Association Française des Entreprises Privées. Former member, 
Club Entreprises et Cités. Graduate, Polytechnique (X), Corps des Mines 
CEO, BNP Paribas. 
CEO, Schneider Electric. Former member, Club Entreprises et Cités. Friend 
of Bébéar 
 
 
 
Chair, René Barbier wine group 
CEO, ContiGroup. Member, Council on Foreign Relations.  
CEO, Royal Philips Electronics Group 
Member, US Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board. Senior Fellow, Council 
on Foreign Relations 
  
Messier 
 
 
Beffa  
 
 
Friedmann 
 
Espalioux 
 
 
Arnault 
 
 
 
 
 
Koplowitz 
Viénot 
Foriel-
Destezet 
* Dominique Hoenn resigned during 2003. 
 ¥ The participation of Edgar Bronfman and Edgar Bronfman Jr. in any committees and Board meetings was suspended in May 
2003 after the latter advised his intention to lead a consortium of potential purchasers of the American group assets. (VU Press 
release, 21 May 2003, http://www.amf-france.org/).  
Source: VU’s 2002 Annual Report. 
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Table 4. Bronfman Family Presence on the Board of Directors of Vivendi (Universal) 
Year % voting 
shares  
Bronfman family members  Other directors with more 
than 5% of voting shares 
2000 8.34 Edgar Bronfman Jr. 
Edgar M Bronfman 
Charles R Bronfman 
5 other directors represented family interests 
(8 of 20 directors)* 
None 
2001 5.59 Edgar Bronfman Jr. 
Edgar M Bronfman 
(2 of 19 directors)* 
None 
2002 4.24 
 
Edgar Bronfman Jr. 
Edgar M Bronfman 
(2 of 12 directors)* 
None 
2003 0.67 Nil 
(none of 10 directors)* 
None 
2004 0.47 Nil 
(none of 12 directors)* 
None 
* For four years, under the terms of a Shareholder Governance Agreement on June 19, 2000, the family was 
allocated three board seats if it held more than 75% of its initial participation; two seats if it held between 50% and 
75%; and one seat if it held between 25% and 50%. This agreement gave the Bronfman shareholders incentive to 
act in concert like one shareholder (VU 2002 annual report).  
 
Source: annual reports accessible at http://www.amf-france.org/ 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 For a fuller understanding of the strong influence of the ENA and the ‘old school’ network in France, see 
Campbell (2014, p. 8). 
 
2 His father was a chartered accountant. 
 
3 Vizzavi Portal added nearly 14 million subscribers to Canal+ in Europe, 8 million subscribers to the mobile 
network SFR, and 48 million subscribers to Vodafone mobile networks. 
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4 For example, music sold by Universal Music could be distributed on the Internet via Vizzavi and downloaded as a 
ringtone through SFR. 
 
5 Dickerson (2003: 1044-1048) provides a competing explanation for the removal of Messier. He points to concerns 
about the effrontery of a stock option proposal for senior executives, a breach of fiduciary duties by managers, and 
untested claims that ‘VU’s public documents were misleading [and that] Messier had systematically sought to hide 
the company’s liquidity problems.’ 
 
6 The Paris Match report on Messier in New York (‘ça tourne rond à Manhattan’, January 2002) showed him in 
Central Park and in his kitchen with his American collaborators. The French business elite regarded such a display 
as bad taste. 
 
7 Aileen Bronfman (1925 – 1986) was married to a prominent banker, Baron Alain de Gunzburg. Phyllis Bronfman 
(1927 - ) married a banker and cousin of the Rothschilds, was a generous benefactor, and was appointed 
Companion, Order of Canada (2001), Grand Officer, National Order of Quebec (2005), and Officier, Ordre des Arts 
et des Lettres de France. Edgar Bronfman (1929 - ) was elected president of the World Jewish Congress in 1981, 
and was awarded the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1999. Charles Bronfman was Chair of several 
charitable foundations in Israel, the USA and Canada, was a Companion of the Order of Canada, and held honorary 
doctorates from universities in Israel, Canada and the USA. http://www.bronfmanfoundation.org/index.html; 
http://www.hillel.org/about/default; 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199754687.001.0001/acref-9780199754687-e-25  
 
8 http://www.tnova.fr/revue-de-presse/l-influence-des-think-tanks-cerveaux-des-politiques  
 
9 The Economist (4 July 2002, n.p.: ‘Vivendi: A French Exception’) is in little doubt about this. It asserts that 
Messier’s ‘eviction’ from the role of CEO was because he ‘was too French for the Americans and too American for 
the French’ and that French business had an ‘atavistic desire to retreat to its traditional clubbish ways.’ 
 
10 The CAC 40 index on January 2 was 4580.44 and 3669.24 on June 24. (NYSE Euronext website: 
http://www.euronext.com/trader/download/instrument-3047-FR-FR0003500008.html?selectedMep=1) 
 
11 Le Monde, June 26, 2002 ‘La Bourse de Paris au plus bas depuis Septembre 2001’ (http://www.lemonde.fr/). 
Soltani (2014 : 264) makes the unsubstantiated claim that ‘The board of Vivendi Universal unanimously asked 
Messier to quit, and in July 2002 he stepped down.’ 
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12 http://lci.tf1.fr/economie/2002-07/top-chrono-pour-sauvetage-vivendi-4876183.html 
 
13 Our statement is based on the strategic decisions by Jean-René Fourtou as part of his rescue strategy. This 
strategy had been approved by most of the stakeholders, including the banks when they agreed to extend credit 
facilities to VU.  
 
14 This information is reported in many bibliographic sources. 
 
15 ‘Jean-René Fourtou: un profil de redresseur’, Le Figaro Economique, 2 July 2002, http://www.lefigaro.fr/ 
16 http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-societe/2007-01-19/le-pack-d-elite-de-rives/920/0/53106 
 
17 The Economist (17 July 2003; ‘The French Exception, Still Defended’, n.p.) pointed to the day Messier declared 
‘French cultural exception is dead’ as the ‘day the French establishment turned on him.’ Riding (2001, n.p.) noted 
that those in the French movie industry regarded his statement as a ‘threat to their survival.’ 
 
18 http://www.veoliawater.com/search.htm?inp=vivendi&c=0  
 
19 ‘Jean-Marie Messier: les six mois de chute’, Le Monde, 2 July 2002 http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
 
20 ‘Bronfman dynasty confronts its future’, New York Times, 7 July 2002. 
 
21 VU realized €6.7 billion from asset disposals in the second half of 2002, and €3 billion in 2003. 
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